Following the multistage design approach, we propose two asymptotically efficient truthful double auction mechanisms, the BC-LP mechanism and the MBC mechanism, for an exchange market with many buyers and sellers. In this market, each buyer wants to procure a bundle of commodities and each seller supplies one unit of a commodity. Furthermore, various transaction-related costs will be incurred w...

In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers that arrive and depart over time. Our algorithm, Chain, provides the first framework that allows a truthful dynamic double auction (DA) to be construct...

This paper studies the impact of second-order uncertainty on the (ex-post) efficiency of the 0.5-double auction. We consider a discrete double auction model in which the seller’s valuation is either vs or vs and the buyer’s valuation is either vb or vb with 0 = vs < vb < vs < vb = 1. The buyer’s valuation and the seller’s valuation are private information. We further assume that the buyer’s bel...

In most electronic auctions conducted over the Internet today price is still the only decision criteria for the best bid. This is true for all sorts of auctions in the electronic business areas consumer-to-consumer (c2c), business-toconsumer (b2c), and business-to-business (b2b). Especially for many situations in the b2b area there are other important attributes apart from price to be considere...

Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simu...

In this paper, we suggest using an English Auction Protocol for a procurement multi-attribute auction in which the item for sale is defined by several attributes, the buyer agent is the auctioneer, and the seller agents are the bidders. Such domains include auctions on task allocation, services, or compound products. At the beginning of the auction the buyer agent announces the required propert...

Demonstrating the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss three different approaches to proof or check such property in regard of a multi-attribute auction mechanism: by analyzing well-known sufficient conditions, by mathematical analyzing the rules that govern the mechanism, and by empirically che...

Its protocol calls for Annex B counties to reduce their average greenhouse gas emissions over 2008-2012 to at least five percent below 1990 levels. It adopted a " Plan of Action. " Since no details were given at these COPs, we have to design the mechanisms. 3 3. Which Trading Rule? • Bilateral Trading Is it inefficient due to mismatching? Does the revelation of contracted prices improve its eff...

This paper deals with the market structure at the opening of the trading day and its influence on subsequent trading. We compare a single continuous double auction and two complement markets with different call auction designs as opening mechanisms in a unified experimental framework. The call auctions differ with respect to their levels of transparency. We find that a call auction not only imp...