Hybrid organizational forms such as franchise systems join two or more independent parties under a contract. The ability of each party to achieve its goals depend upon the relative bargaining power in the relationship established by the contract. Using transaction cost economics and Porter’s (1980) characterization of sources of bargaining power, this paper argues that the franchisor can make i...

In this paper we combine the efficiency wage and union-firm bargaining approaches to wage determination to produce a unified model that encapsulates both. We find that combining efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining leads to higher wages, confirming an original insight of Summers. We also find that increases in bargaining power and monopoly power on the goods market have a stronger impact ...

Bargained Wages, Wage Drift and the Design of the Wage Setting System This paper aims at answering the question: How does a typically 'European' bargaining system with collective bargaining, extension mechanisms and national minimum wage coexist with low unemployment rate and high wage flexibility? A unique data set on workers, firms and collective bargaining contracts in the Portuguese economy...

We compare Gamson’s Law, a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining, with two non-cooperative bargaining models in three player divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own. Both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does Gamson’s Law. We al...

This paper aims at answering the question: How does a typically European bargaining system |with collective bargaining, extension mechanisms and national minimum wage |coexist with low unemployment rate and high wage °exibility? A unique data set on workers, ̄rms and collective bargaining contracts in the Portuguese economy is used to analyze the determinants of both the bargained wage and the ...

To relax the assumption that licensees have no bargaining power, which is prevalent in the licensing literature, the Rubinstein bargaining model is integrated with a duopoly licensing model in this paper. The licensor always licenses the best technology regardless of whether the technology advances are negotiated or solely determined by the licensor. Further, royalties prove to be the only paym...

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom based on individual rationality we ...

Existing evidence suggests that girls are differentially affected by income shocks and changes in bargaining power. Most studies, however, ignore household production and confound differential opportunity costs with changes in income or bargaining power. I disentangle these determinants of gender discrimination—preferences, income and time allocation—by comparing households with varying degrees...