In applying the common agency framework to the context of an oligopolistic industry, we want to go beyond the classical dichotomy between Cournot and Bertrand competition. We deÞne two games, the oligopolistic game and the corresponding concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, and an associated auxiliary game that can be interpreted as a common agency game and that has the same set of equilibria. ...

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding o ers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to eÆcient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-...

This paper analyzes a simple, repeated game of simultaneous entry and pricing. We report a surprising property of the symmetric equilibrium solution: If the number of potential competitors is increased above two, the market breaks down with higher probability, and the competitive outcome becomes less likely. More potential competition lowers welfare | another Bertrand paradox. The model can als...

Aggregative games are used to model strategic interaction in many …elds of economics, including industrial organization, political economy, international trade, and public …nance. In such games, each player’s payo¤ depends on his/her own actions and an aggregate of all player’s actions. Examples in industrial organization are the Cournot oligopoly model, logit and CES di¤erentiated products Ber...

In a theoretical framework we compare production-in-advance type and production-to-order type environments. We carry out our analysis in the framework of a symmetric capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game and prove that the equilibrium profits are the same in case of production in advance and production to order. In addition, advance production results in higher prices than produc...

The aim of the paper is to study the Bertrand duopoly example in the quantum domain. We use two ways to write the game in terms of quantum theory. The first one adapts the Li-Du-Massar scheme for the Cournot duopoly. The second one is a simplified model that exploits a two qubit entangled state. In both cases we focus on finding Nash equilibria in the resulting games.

We introduce the concept of disjoint payo¤matching which can be used to show that the mixed extension of a compact game is payo¤ secure. By putting minor structure on the discontinuities, we need only check payo¤s at each strategy rather than in neighborhoods of each strategy pro…le, placing minimal restriction on the payo¤s at points of discontinuity. The results are used to verify existence o...

This paper investigates the quality and pricing decisions in a supply chain consists of one retailer two manufacturers. The updates trust value to manufacturers based on historical information product determine actual order quantity. We propose four game models by considering situations, i.e. , manufacturer-dominant scenario retailer-dominant scenario. Based theoretical numerical analysis, we o...

Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, & Shleifer [Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2008] put forward a model of coarse thinking. The essential idea behind coarse thinking is that agents put situations into categories and then apply the same model of inference to all situations in a given category. We extend the argument to strategies in a game-theoretic setting and propose the following: Agents split...

Duopolies are one of the simplest economic situations where interactions between firms determine market behavior. The standard model a price-setting duopoly is Bertrand model, which has unique solution that both set their prices equal to costs—a paradoxical result obtain zero profit, generally not observed in real duopolies. Here we propose new game theory for duopoly, show resolves behavior an...