We study the computational complexity of optimal bribery and manipulation schemes for sports tournaments with uncertain information: cup; challenge or caterpillar; and round robin. Our results carry over to the equivalent voting rules: sequential pair-wise elections, cup, and Copeland, when the set of candidates is exactly the set of voters. This restriction creates new difficulties for most ex...

We study the complexity of the destructive bribery problem—an external agent tries to prevent a disliked candidate from winning by bribery actions— in voting over combinatorial domains, where the set of candidates is the Cartesian product of several issues. This problem is related to the concept of the margin of victory of an election which constitutes a measure of robustness of the election ou...

I propose a bribery model with decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are multiple stable equilibria: high levels of bribery reduce the economy’s productivity due to suppression of small businesses, and reduces the total graft even though it might increase the individual bribe amount. The coordinated deviation to a better participation equilibrium is impossible due to decentralization...

Harassment bribes, paid by citizens to corrupt officers for services the former are legally entitled to, constitute one of the most widespread forms of corruption in many countries. Nation states have adopted different policies to address this form of corruption. While some countries make both the bribe giver and the bribe taker equally liable for the crime, others impose a larger penalty on co...

In the Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election (based on preference orders), a preferred candidate p, and a budget. The goal is to ensure p’s victory by shifting p higher in some voters’ preference orders. However, each such shift request comes at a price (depending on the voter and on the extent of the shift) and we must not exceed the given budget. We study the parameterized computati...

This review synthesizes the literature studying illegality and government corruption in forest management. After discussing the theoretical connections between different types of corruption and illegal forest-related activities it describes the major trends in previous studies, examining crossnational patterns as well as local in-depth studies. Both theory and available empirical findings provi...

Exploiting a unique data set containing information on the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms, we study the relationship between bribery payments, taxes and firm growth over the period 1995-97. Using industry-location averages to circumvent the potential problem of endogeneity, and to deal with issues of measurement error, we find that both the rate of taxation and bribery are negatively...

We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the set of candidates and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber’s favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of ...

The Regulation of Transnational Bribery by Kevin E. Davis, strips out the universal character illegitimate payments used to bribe public officials foreign countries in milieu international business which has been known for years. manuscript deals with various definitions bribery as a transaction an official misuse his or her office “as result considerations personal gain, need not be monetary”....