In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgments. much recent philosophical literature, this kind of doubt has been analysed terms uncertainty one’s beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that judgments express a conative attitude, more akin to desire than belief. This paper presents scientifically informed reconciliation non-cognitivism and doubt. The central claim is attitudi...

The moral error theory, it seems, could be true. mere possibility of its truth might also seem inconsequential. But is not. For, I argue, there a sense in which the theory possible that generates an argument against both non-cognitivism and naturalism. argue epistemic morality subject to some form wholesale kind would make Denying this has three unwelcome consequences such allowing for explaini...

Abstract We propose a non-representationalist framework for deep learning relying on novel method computational phenomenology, dialogue between the first-person perspective (relying phenomenology) and mechanisms of models. thereby an alternative to modern cognitivist interpretation learning, according which artificial neural networks encode representations external entities. This mainly relies ...