In this paper we discuss the problem of the neural conditions of shared attitudes and intentions: which neural mechanisms underlie "we-mode" processes or serve as precursors to such processes? Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence suggests that in different areas of the brain neural representations are shared by several individuals. This situation, on the one hand, creates a potent...

The majority of software has no meta-level perception of what it is doing, or what it intends to achieve. Without such higher cognitive functions, we might be disinclined to bestow creativity onto such software. We generalise previous work on collage generation, which attempted to blur the line between the intentionality of the programmer and that of the software in the visual arts. Firstly, we...

Play is a widespread phenomenon in the animal kingdom. But only humans engage in games, that is, in rule-governed, conventional play activities. We move pieces of wood on a board according to some arbitrary rules, making some of the pieces queens, others knights, and the whole activity that of chess. We walk on stages and declare war or peace—in games of makebelieve. No other species engages in...

Put in a nutshell, the following view of the nature of communicative action seems worth considering. Communication presupposes a framework of mutual knowledge (at least mutual true beliefs) and assumptions about language (or whatever representational system is used). This underlying level need not contain any knowledge or assumptions about the goals of the users of language, in particular no as...

We propose a first step in the development of an integrated theory of the emergence of distributed cognition/extended mind. Distributed cognition is seen as the confluence of collective intelligence and “situatedness”, or the extension of cognitive processes into the physical environment. The framework is based on five fundamental assumptions: 1) groups of agents self-organize to form a differe...

The focus of the present study was the role of cultural learning in infants' acquisition of pretense actions with objects. In three studies, 18- and 24-month-olds (n = 64) were presented with novel objects, and either pretense or instrumental actions were demonstrated with these. When children were then allowed to act upon the objects themselves, qualitatively similar patterns of cultural (imit...

In ''The Myth of Original Intentionality,'' Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality. 1. Humans lack original intentionality. 2. Humans have derived intentionality only. 3. There is no distinction between original and derived intentionality. 4. There is no such thing as original intentio...