A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of the valuations define supply and demand functions. One unit of the good is auctioned. At successive, discrete time instances, a player is randomly selected ...

Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the assumption of IID random order flow, and analyze it using simulation, dimensional analysis, and theoretical tools based on mean field approximations. The model make...

This paper examines economic resource allocation through a number of auction types for a grid of ewaste computers. It examines the time to complete tasks and the energy usage of completing the tasks on a grid. A model of a simulated grid is developed and used to evaluate the resource allocation mechanisms. The model is an agent-based simulation where by user agents submit tasks to node agents t...

This paper describes the implementation and design of a web-scale electronic continuous double auction system. The intention of this system is to facilitate multiple simultaneous participants in the form of autonomous trading agents; an individual agent may only trade in a single market at a time, though a single commodity may be traded in multiple markets by multiple agents simultaneously. The...

In this paper we explore how specific aspects of mechanism design affect the efficiency of the market outcome. In particular, we are interested whether the availability of information about actions of other participants improves market efficiency. We consider a simple market of a homogeneous good populated by buyers and sellers. The valuations of the buyers and the costs of the sellers are give...

Auctions are a fundamental mechanism to automate negotiations in electronic commerce. We consider a class of multi-lateral negotiation situations, which requires negotiation on multiple attributes of a deal. These situations are typical for corporate procurement. Current auction implementations do not support these negotiations adequately. In the paper we propose multi-attribute auctions, an ec...

This paper presents results from ongoing investigations into the performance of the Michigan-style classifier system in a complex multi-agent environment. Using a simplified model of a continuous double-auction market place the use of ZCS as an adaptive economic trading agent is examined. It is shown that a number of small changes to the basic system greatly improves its performance, resulting ...

Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simu...