Whereas in the absence of capacity constraints the Cournot outcome is the unique coalition-proof supply function equilibrium outcome, the presence of capacity constraints may enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes. Interestingly, if capacities are sufficiently asymmetric the new equilibrium prices are below the Cournot price. These results have important implications for merger and privatizati...

We show the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies with trade in a model of noncooperative exchange with some large traders and many small traders in which traders are allowed to buy and sell each commodity. Moreover, we show, by an example, that, even with identical large traders of equal measure, our model yields Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations which are not Walrasian...

In this paper we extend the basic model of Cournot competition to the case where both the demand function and the cost functions of each firm depend on the amounts produced by competitors. In this modified setting, proving existence of equilibria becomes harder. We develop a generalization of the theory of supermodular games in the context where individual decision variables take values in a to...

The notion of Nash equilibria plays a key role in the analysis of strategic interactions in the framework of N player games. Analysis of Nash equilibria is however a complex issue when the number of players is large. In this article, we emphasize the role of optimal transport theory in (i) the passage from Nash to Cournot-Nash equilibria as the number of players tends to infinity and (ii) the a...

In this paper, we study an incomplete information dynamical system. Then, we suggest a modification of this system and we applied it to the standard Cournot game. The equilibrium solutions and the conditions of their locally asymptotic stability for the static and the dynamic in monopoly and duopoly cases are studied. Also, we formulate and study the multi-team dynamic Cournot game. (C) 2012 El...

This paper focuses on the role that production subsidies play in a Bertrand mixed duopoly. The paper examines four regimes: mixed and private duopoly, each with and without subsidies. The results of this study are compared with the findings of the existing Cournot mixed market literature. As a result, the paper shows that that the introduction of production subsidies into the analyses of Bertra...

We consider an observer who makes a finite number of observations of an industry producing a homogeneous good, where each observation consists of the market price and firm-specific production quantities. We develop a revealed preference test (in the form of a linear program) for the hypothesis that the firms are playing a Cournot game, assuming that they have convex cost functions that do not c...

We examine the Cournot oligopoly model in the context of social and individual learning. In both models of learning, firms update their decisions about how much to produce via variants of the genetic algorithm updating procedure. Arifovic (1994) found that both models of social and individual learning converged to the Walrasian, competitive equilibrium. Vriend (2000) reports that the model of s...

This paper reconsiders the well known comparison of equilibrium entry levels into a Cournot industry under free entry and under the two commonly used socially optimal schemes. Allowing for the possibility of increasing returns to scale in production, this paper generalizes the conclusion of [Mankiw and Whinston, Rand J. 1986], that free entry yields more …rms than the second-best socially optim...

We examine learning by artificial agents in repeated play of Cournot duopoly games. Our learning model is simple and cognitively realistic. The model departs from standard reinforcement learning models, as applied to agents in games, in that it credits the agent with a form of conceptual ascent, whereby the agent is able to learn from a consideration set of strategies spanning more than one per...