We develop a formal theory of mereology that includes relations that change over time. We show how this theory formalizes reasoning over domains of material objects, which include not only integral objects (my computer, your liver) but also portions of stuff (the water in your glass, the blood in a vial). In particular, we use different mereological summation relations to distinguish between th...

Psychological essentialism is the belief that some internal, unseen essence or force determines the common outward appearances and behaviors of category members. We investigated whether reasoning about transplants of bodily elements showed evidence of essentialist thinking. Both Americans and Indians endorsed the possibility of transplants conferring donors' personality, behavior, and luck on r...

Two experiments examine the evolution of folkbiological reasoning in children (4 to 10 years of age) and adults from four distinct communities (rural Native American, rural majority culture, and suburban and urban North American communities). Using an adoption paradigm, we examine participants’ intuitions regarding the inheritance of properties and the mechanisms underlying the transmission of ...

This paper is devoted to defending philosophical studies of mind, especially traditional ones. In my view, human mentality is a dialogue with myself, which has a social aspect that is never explained nor predicted by scientific studies. We firstly derive this picture from Descartes’ classical argmuments (§§2-3), and then develop it in the context of Kantian ethics (§4). Some readers think this ...

In two recent papers, Rose and Nichols present evidence in favor of the view that humans represent category essences terms a telos, such as honey-making, not scientific essences, bee DNA. Here, I challenge their interpretation show it is directly predicted by main theory they seek to undermine. argue results can be explained instances diagnostic reasoning about essences.

This essay examines the proposal that psychological essentialism results from a history of natural selection acting on human representation and inference systems. It has been argued that the features that distinguish essentialist representational systems are especially well suited for representing natural kinds. If the evolved function of essentialism is to exploit the rich inductive potential ...