This article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value environments. We show that efficient collusion is always possible in private value environments, but may not be in common value environments with a binding reserve price. In the latter case, collusion does more than simply transfer rents from the seller to the buyers, it also gives buyers a chance to p...

E-consumers face biggest challenge of opting for the best bidding strategies for competing in an environment of multiple and simultaneous online auctions for same or similar items. It becomes very complicated for the bidders to make decisions of selecting which auction to participate in, place single or multiple bids, early or late bidding and how much to bid. In this paper, we present the desi...

We examine a model in which buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. In each period, a new buyer probabilistically arrives to the market, and is endowed with a constant private value. We demonstrate by way of a simple example the inefficiency of the second-price sealed-bid auction in this setting, and therefore focus instead on the ascending auction. We th...

As auctions buyers and sellers become proliferated on the Internet, there are considerable interests in investigating consumer behavior in the new marketing context. Much of the research on online consumer behavior has focused on the economic dynamics of bidding and offerings, technical mechanism and privacy, while consumer trade-offs between auctions alternatives are still lacking in literatur...

In this paper we study a genetic fuzzy system approach to assess suitable bidding strategies for agents in online auction environments. Assessing efficient bidding strategies allows evaluation of auction models and verification whether the mechanism design achieves its goals. Day-ahead electricity auctions are particularly explored to give an experimental instance of the approach developed in t...

In Name-Your-Own-Price auctions (NYOP), prospective buyers bid against a secret reserve price set by the seller and only win the auction at the price of their bid if it is equal or higher than the seller’s reserve price. Thus, bidders who want to win the auction without too much overbidding have a strong incentive to learn more about the seller’s secret reserve price, possibly via their own net...

Online auction web sites provide a convenient yet risky trading venue for the participants. The uncertainty about the product quality and the credibility of the traders, however, may impede the liquidity and efficiency of the trades in online auctions. This research seeks to establish a framework to better assess the effect of a seller’s feedback “reputation” on the closing price of an online a...

A Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is a powerful auction mechanism used in online share trading. A CDA has many buyers and sellers continually exchanging items. Implementing an online CDA in software is more complicated than a regular online auction (such as eBay). This paper describes our experiences with implementing an online CDA. We present the model as an abstraction of the online share tra...

The increasing prevalence of auctions as a method of conducting a variety of transactions has promoted interest in modelling bidding behaviours with simulated agent models. The majority of popular research has focused on double auctions, i.e. auctions with multiple buyers and sellers. In this paper we investigate agent models of sealed bid auctions, i.e. single seller auctions where each buyer ...

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should overbid in equilibrium when they know their rival has a higher value than their own, and bidders wi...