Duopolies are one of the simplest economic situations where interactions between firms determine market behavior. The standard model a price-setting duopoly is Bertrand model, which has unique solution that both set their prices equal to costs—a paradoxical result obtain zero profit, generally not observed in real duopolies. Here we propose new game theory for duopoly, show resolves behavior an...

Dynamic spectrum sharing is a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization in the future wireless networks. The flexible spectrum management provides new opportunities for licensed primary user and unlicensed secondary users to reallocate the spectrum resource efficiently. In this paper, we present an oligopoly pricing framework for dynamic spectrum allocation in which the primary users...

This paper examines the behaviour of two firms competing in a duopoly, where can influence demand through use advertising. The simulates strategic interaction based on game-theoretic Cournot analytical model. evolution over time Nash equilibrium is graphically displayed for number different competitive scenarios. results show that there exist threshold levels advertising effectiveness at which ...

Cooperative advertising is a key incentive offered by a manufacturer to influence retailers’ promotional decisions. We study cooperative advertising in a dynamic retail duopoly where a manufacturer sells his product through two competing retailers. We model the problem as a Stackelberg differential game in which the manufacturer announces his shares of advertising costs of the two retailers or ...

This paper demonstrates that in a duopoly model with firms being concerned about profit as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR), the outcome of game may coincide with the Stackelberg outcome. We argue that owner of the firm may use CSR orientation as a strategy to become Stackelberg leader in the quantity competition game.

Abstract: In this paper, setting the high-tech industry as the background, we build a dynamic duopoly game model in two cases with different government subsidies based on the innovation inputs and outputs, respectively. We analyze the equilibrium solution and stability conditions of the system, and study the dynamic evolution of the system under the conditions of different system parameters by ...

This paper deals with the approximation of Nash-equilibria in m-player games. We present conditions under which an approximating sequence of games admits near-equilibria that approximate near equilibria in the limit game. We apply the results to two classes of games: (i) a duopoly game approximated by a sequence of matrix games; (ii) a stochastic game played under the S-adapted information stru...

Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations firms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, firms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines fitness in the evolutionary game. Based on linear heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand competition models, we show that the unique conjectures that are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they a...

The inventories carried in a supply chain as strategic tool to influence the competing firms are considered be (SI). We present two-period game-theoretic model, which singular manufacturer supplies products pair of identical Cournot duopolistic retailers. show that SI by retailers under dynamic contract is Pareto-dominating for manufacturer, retailers, consumers, channel, and society well. also...