Why do monetary unions fail? Answers to this question from a material-based approach tend to point to a breakdown in elite political support, especially when actors have material incentives to ‘cheat’ on their multilateral commitments rather than cooperate to overcome the collective action problem that a monetary union entails. Recent ideational approaches have focused on the role of shared eco...

This article takes the existence of power networks of local elites as a social fact of fundamental importance and the starting point for the study of patronage in the governance of the coastal waters of East Kalimantan. We address the question of how to capture the elites for project implementation, rather than assuming the inevitability of elite capture of project funds. We analyze the multipl...

This article presents a systematic content analysis of three religious-conservative and two pro-secular newspapers in 1996–2004 in Turkey, and discusses some findings and their implications regarding elite values and democratization: considerable internal pluralism within both religious-conservative and pro-secular elites; general consensus on democracy but not on democratic norms’ application ...

Old elites can block changes, but not all do. Why is it that stronger elites may allow more changes than weaker elites? Why do economies with larger stocks of natural resources not grow faster than economies poorer in natural resources? We argue that old elites hold some power to extract rents from the economy. Whereas old sectors (i.e. agriculture or extraction of natural resources) are not af...