It has long been known in the field of population genetics that adaptive topographies, in which population equilibria maximise mean population fitness for a trait regardless of its genetic bases, do not exist. Whether one chooses to model selection acting on a single locus or multiple loci does matter. In evolutionary game theory, analysis of a simple and general game involving distinct roles f...

Evolutionary game theory has grown into an active area of research that bridges concepts from biology, evolution, nonlinear dynamics, and game theory. The mechanisms necessary to conduct an evolutionary analysis of games are presented. Relations between evolutionary stable strategies and Nash equilibria are considered. Replicator dynamics are developed and applied to three relevant games. The a...

This paper investigates a deterministic evolutionary process governing the adoption of strategies for playing the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Agents playing unsuccessful strategies attempt to imitate the strategies of successful agents. Because agents' strategies are unobservable, they must be inferred from a memory of pairwise play and a knowledge of the strategy space. As a result, winning s...

GQM+Strategies is an approach that aligns the business goals at each level of an organization to strategies to achieve overall business goals and assesses the achievement of such goals. Strategies are extracted from business goals based on rationales (contexts and assumptions). Using the proposed approach, which refines the GQM+Strategies model by extracting rationales based on the analysis of ...

In game theory, an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES set) is a set of Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies that give the same payoffs. Similar to an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ES strategy), an ES set is also a strict NE. This work investigates the evolutionary stability of classical and quantum strategies in the quantum penny flip games. In particular, we developed an evolutionary game theory mode...

We introduce a new class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the payoffs of strategies which revising agents are abandoning. Stable games subsume many well-known cl...

We present insights and empirical results from an extensive numerical study of the evolutionary dynamics of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Fixation probabilities for Moran processes are obtained for all pairs of 164 different strategies including classics such as TitForTat, zero determinant strategies, and many more sophisticated strategies. Players with long memories and sophisticated behavi...

The replicator equation is a simple model of evolution that leads to stable form of Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). No individuals get an incentive unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium. It has been studied in connection with Evolutionary Game Theory, a theory John Maynard Smith and George R. Price developed to predict biological reproductive success of populations. ...