In an attempt to examine genomic function of the oocyte nucleus during meiotic maturation, the effects of X-irradiation on the oocyte of the frog (Rana pipiens) were studied. When oocytes were irradiated with 6000-36000 R before initiation of maturation, the ovulated eggs frequently failed to be fertilized and the jelly surrounding the unfertilizable eggs was always damaged. However, the egg it...

M. R. Dougherty, A. M. Franco-Watkins, and R. Thomas (2008) conjectured that fast and frugal heuristics need an automatic frequency counter for ordering cues. In fact, only a few heuristics order cues, and these orderings can arise from evolutionary, social, or individual learning, none of which requires automatic frequency counting. The idea that cue validities cannot be computed because memor...

In an attempt to examine genomic function of the oocyte nucleus during meiotic maturation, the effects of X-irradiation on the oocyte of the frog (Rana pipiens) were studied. When oocytes were irradiated with 6000-36000 R before initiation of maturation, the ovulated eggs frequently failed to be fertilized and the jelly surrounding the unfertilizable eggs was always damaged. However, the egg it...

The discussion of conjunction fallacies or, more generally, inclusion fallacies (IFs) is usually limited to dyadic relationships. Bayesian logic formalizes a rational intensional probability, predicting IFs and supplementing standard extensional probabilities (von Sydow, 2011, 2016). They treat logical patterns as explanatory patterns (explanans) given some data (the explanandum). We here addre...

Individuals can partly recreate the "wisdom of crowds" within their own minds by combining nonredundant estimates they themselves have generated. Herzog and Hertwig (2009) showed that this accuracy gain could be boosted by urging people to actively think differently when generating a 2nd estimate ("dialectical bootstrapping"). Although the "crowd within" promises accuracy gains, it remains uncl...

Comments on the article by E. Brandstätter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig. The authors discuss the priority heuristic, a recent model for decisions under risk. They reanalyze the experimental validity of this approach and discuss how these results compare with cumulative prospect theory, the currently most established model in behavioral economics. They also discuss how general models for decis...

Does a sense of recognition play a pre-eminent role when it comes to people’s inferences and choices? Many studies have investigated how people make decisions based on their previous encounters with an object or situation. To illustrate this, researchers have examined how consumers rely on their familiarity with brand names when deciding which consumer goods to buy (Coates, Butler, & Berry, 200...

In 5 experiments, we studied precautionary decisions in which participants decided whether or not to buy insurance with specified cost against an undesirable event with specified probability and cost. We compared the risks taken for precautionary decisions with those taken for equivalent monetary gambles. Fitting these data to Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) prospect theory, we found that the wei...

Once people know the outcome of an event, they tend to overestimate what could have been anticipated in foresight. Although typically considered to be a robust phenomenon, this hindsight bias is subject to moderating circumstances. In their meta-analysis, Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) observed that the more experience people have with the task under consideration, the smaller is the ...