This paper examines whether an individual-level transfer of property rights increases the individual’s bargaining power within the household. The question is analyzed in the context of a housing reform that occurred in China that gave existing tenants the opportunity to purchase the homes that they had been renting from their state employers. The rights to each housing unit were granted to a pa...

in this paper, we analyze the effect of lack of capital investment on energy projects using game theory in the guise of cooperative games. we focus on the energy projects in the provincial level as case study during 2010-2011. therefore, we design a theoretical model of the lack of capital investment as a factor influencing the implement of energy projects. in the experimental section, we deter...

Abstract This paper analyzes the intrahousehold bargaining power of spouses in Spanish families, a collective framework. We estimate household labor supply equations and, under certain testable restrictions, we obtain theoretically derived sharing rule for income, which characterizes power. Then, using unique data on decision-making household, construct Pareto weights, and study validity model ...

In 2009, Horrell, Meredith and Oxley used trends in body mass to argue that poor London women in the later 19th century suffered declining access to household resources over their lifetimes. The authors evaluated competing models of household behaviour, rejected the unitary model of equal distribution throughout the household, saw some support for a safety-first model, but on the whole conclude...

The paper reviews recent theory and empirical evidence testing unitary versus collective models of the household. In contrast to the unitary model, the collective model posits that individuals within households have different preferences and do not pool their income. Moreover, the collective model predicts that intrahousehold allocations reflect differences in preferences and "bargaining power"...

This paper investigates how the control and devolution of productive assets are allocated among husband and wife. Theory predicts that bargaining power within marriage depends on the division of assets upon divorce (exit option) and on control over assets during marriage (noncooperative marriage). In empirical applications, bargaining power is typically proxied by variables such as dowry paymen...

Cooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation Several theoretical contributions, starting with McElroy and Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980), have suggested to model household behavior as a Nash-bargaining game. Since then, very few attempts have been made to operationalize cooperative models of household labor supply for pol...

This paper identifies three possible outcomes of higher relative firm bargaining power in a unionized firm facing an upward sloping labor supply curve. The conventional regime with reduced wage and higher employment corresponds to firm bargaining power below a certain critical value. A supply constrained regime where increased firm bargaining power reduces both wages and employment occurs when ...