Abstract Humeans about laws maintain that of nature are nothing over and above the complete distribution non-modal, categorical properties in spacetime. ‘Humean compatibilists’ argue if Humeanism is true, then agents a deterministic world can do otherwise than they lawfully determined to because distinctive Humean laws. More specifically, reject central premise Consequence argument by maintaini...

Possible worlds, concrete or abstract as you like, are irrelevant to the truthmakers for modality—or so I shall argue in this paper. First, I present the neo-Humean picture of modality, and explain why those who accept it deny a common sense view of modality. Second, I present what I take to be the most pressing objection to the neo-Humean account, one that, I argue, applies equally well to any...

GRW theory postulates a stochastic mechanism assuring that every so often the wave function of a quantum system is ‘hit’, which leaves it in a localised state. How are we to interpret the probabilities built into this mechanism? GRW theory is a firmly realist proposal and it is therefore clear that these probabilities are objective probabilities (i.e. chances). A discussion of the major theorie...

According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. reasons are independent actual desires. In this paper, I argue is version compatible with existence reasons. The key distinguish between (i) process rational deliberation starts off an agent's desires, and (ii) principle agent employs such process. main...

Humean supervenience (HS) is the thesis that everything supervenes upon the spatiotemporal distribution of local intrinsic qualities. A recent threat to HS, originating in thought experiments by Armstrong and Kripke, claims that the mere possibility of rotating homogeneous discs proves HS false. I argue that the rotating disc argument (RDA) fails. If I am right, Humeans needn’t abandon or alter...

Humean compatibilists argue that determinism is compatible with leeway freedom. They refute one of the premises consequence argument we have no choice about laws nature, and they do this by arguing nature does not prevent us from doing otherwise necessity since are just regularities. One humean compatibilists, Bernald Berofsky, starts off his critique premise pointing out standard fails to deal...