We consider locally incentive compatible mechanisms with deterministic allocation rules and transfers with quasilinear utility. We identify a rich class of type spaces, which includes the single peaked type space, where local incentive compatibility does not imply incentive compatibility. Our main result shows that in such type spaces, a mechanism is locally incentive compatible and payment-onl...

W develop and test an incentive-compatible Conjoint Poker (CP) game. The preference data collected in the context of this game are comparable to incentive-compatible choice-based conjoint (CBC) analysis data. We develop a statistical efficiency measure and an algorithm to construct efficient CP designs. We compare incentive-compatible CP to incentive-compatible CBC in a series of three experime...

We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free). Mechanisms satisfying each requirement separately have been studied extensively, but there are few results on mechanisms achieving both. We are interested in those allocat...

When subjects in an experiment are given multiple decisions, their choices in one decision may be distorted by the choices made in others. An experiment’s payment mechanism is incentive compatible if no such distortions occur. Azrieli et al. (2014) provide two characterizations of incentive compatible mechanisms in a general decisiontheoretic framework in subjects’ choices are represented as Sa...

We introduce and study a new auction model in which a certain type of goods is offered over a period of time, and buyers arrive at different times and stay until a common deadline (unless their purchase requests have been fulfilled). We examine in this model incentive compatible auction protocols (i.e., those that induce participants to bid their true valuations). We establish an interesting co...

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a socially designed characteristic function, which expresses the fact that coalitions allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible mechanisms. We …rst survey some results in the case of perfectly divisible goods. Examples then show that the ex ante incentive compatible core ...

How should a capacity-constrained firm design an incentive-compatible price-scheduling mechanism to maximize revenues from a heterogeneous pool of time-sensitive customers with private information on their willingness to pay, time-sensitivity and processing requirement? We consider this question in the context of a queueing system that serves two customer types. We provide the following insight...