This is a different question. Call this the Evidence Question. The EvidenceFor Question has received significant attention. Debates in the Bayesian literature about the correct confirmation function, for instance, are aimed at the answering the Evidence-For Question.1 The Evidence Question is somewhat less investigated.2 Nevertheless, it is important. According to prominent epistemological view...

Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the ...

When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) have turned to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use, they have typically referred to perception, memory or motor coordination. Not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore here is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). In this paper, we try to clarify the potential relationship between these ...

The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist–internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internal...

This paper is a companion to “Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument against Externalist Intentionalism” (forthcoming, with a reply by Michael Tye, in Nous). I generalize the argument of that previous paper. I attempt to show that, given the mild form of Internalism argued for in the previous paper, it is not only the case that the awareness relation cannot be ...