This study outlines a new theory linking industry structure to optimal employment contracts and executive short-termism. Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market. To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration. Such remuneration introduces a myopia problem: an executive would wish to inflate early expected earnings at some risk...

We build a general equilibrium model of occupation choice, where the risks inherent in a technology embodying a new innovation are only vaguely known (ambiguous), whereas the old technology has known risks. Using the Arrow-Hurwicz criterion to characterise decisionmaking in the face of ambiguity, we distinguish agents according to their degree of ambiguity aversion. Equilibrium requires that al...

Informal employment is a pervasive and persistent feature of most developing and developed economies. Labour taxation and labour market regulations are deemed two major causes for operating in the informal sector. Using data from France, Italy, and Spain, we analyse gross job flows and gross worker flows in the formal and informal sectors in the presence of lenient employment protection legisla...

We study the role of labour and credit market imperfections for the determination of equilibrium unemployment. In the credit market loan contracts are negotiated between financiers and firms, both possessing bargaining power, while the firms and organized labour bargain over the base wage. The sequential labour and credit market negotiations are assumed to take place conditional on the firm hav...

In-house outsourcing, where activities are maintained under the same roof, is a major organizational innovation. This paper conducts in-depth analysis of ‘in-house’ outsourcing strategies at Fiat Auto in Italy. It grasps the complex nature of the implications of such a strategy for the organisation of production and social and industrial relations by providing a rich material for such analysis....

We estimate a model of labour demand that accounts for dynamics arising from the relative costs of hiring and "ring workers on either inde"nite-term contract (ITC) or "xed-term contract (FTC). We use a panel of 1000 French "rms, for which we can measure the number of entries and exits for each type of contract between 1988 and 1992. Our estimates suggest that (1) it is much more costly to lay o...

A management framework has been successfully utilized at Imperial College London in the United Kingdom to improve the process for developing and managing university-industry research collaborations. The framework has been part of a systematic approach to increase the level of research contracts from industrial sources, to strengthen the university’s academic base, and to diversify the provision...

Based on linked administrative and survey panel data, we analyse the labour supply behaviour of physicians who could adopt either a standard fee-for-service contract or mixed remuneration (MR) contract. Under MR, received per diem reduced fee for services provided. We present estimates structural discrete choice model that incorporates service intensity (services provided hour) into framework. ...

Abstract Despite Sweden’s national gender-neutral family and social policies, local differences in gender contracts exist have been related to the structure of labour market cultural traditions. Existing studies are outdated used relatively large administratively defined areas, which may lead several measurement interpretation errors. This paper examines geographical variation present-day Swede...