The separation of ownership and control in corporations opens up the potential for moral hazard. Thus it is conventional wisdom that managers who are not closely monitored pursue personal goals rather than maximize shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about what these goals are, despite the importance of understanding manager behavior when designing corporate governance rules. This paper pro...

Asset allocation is widely recognized as the most fundamental decision in the investment process. Surprisingly little work has been done on examining what drives the asset allocation recommendations of professional investment advisors. To address this issue, we propose a general framework to identify and estimate the parameters characterizing the preferences and beliefs of money managers. In a ...

Much of our understanding of corporations builds on the idea that managers, when they are not closely monitored, will pursue goals that are not in shareholders’ interests. But what goals would managers pursue? This paper uses variation in corporate governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws to empirically map out managerial preferences. We use plant-level data and exploit a uni...

Security managers face the challenge of designing security policies that deliver the objectives required by their organizations. We explain how a rigorous modelling framework and methodology— grounded in semantically justified mathematical systems modelling, the economics of decision-making, and simulation—can be used to explore the operational consequences of their design choices and help secu...

In the literature on scheduling of construction projects it is difficult to find a justification for adopting criteria evaluating work schedules based explicitly preferences those who develop them. This article tries fill this gap and provide information site managers sustainable organization projects. The publication focuses views needs engineering staff regarding methods organization, need re...

Abstract We study theoretically and empirically the relation between altruism incentive contract design. Theoretically, we extend Fischer Huddart (2008) to investigate how social norms reinforce managers’ altruistic preferences, thus affecting optimal design related strength performance measurement. Empirically, draw on notion of an organization’s work climate capture preferences. Using data co...

Conventional models of single district plurality elections show that with three parties anything can happen extreme policies can win regardless of voter preferences. I show that when there are multiple district elections for a legislature we get back to a world where the median voter matters: an extreme policy will generally only come about if it is preferred by the median voter in a majority o...

We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium ...