Strategy-proof mechanisms eliminate the possibility for gain from strategic misrepresentation of preferences. If market participants respond optimally, these mechanisms permit the observation of true preferences and avoid the implicit punishment of market participants who do not try to “game the system.” Using new data from a flagship application of the matching literature—the medical residency...

We study mechanism design in environments where misrepresenting private information is costly. Specifically, a privately informed agent has to take several signalling actions, send several messages or undergo a number of tests in which it is costly for her to misrepresent her type. We derive the optimal mechanism for this environment. A surprising property of the optimal mechanism is the absenc...

Research in social psychology suggests that motives such as self-bolstering and impression management can lead people to engage in deliberate misrepresentationsduring interpersonal communications.This articleextends our understandingof such behaviorto a new domain; that of consumer communications. Drawing on research on lying behavior and symbolic consumption,we suggest that misrepresentationab...

This article suggests that when those engaging in commercial undertakings have a proper understanding of the principles law contract, particularly, pertaining to consensus, they will limit risks conduct cause them financial loss. The definitions mistake and misrepresentation (being factors affecting consensus) need be amplified avoid existing confusion between two terms. Misrepresentation may l...