This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage. We find that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the first mover, although the leader may exit before the follower’s entry. We also see the leverage effects of debt financing increasing firm values and accelerating investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. In addition to ...

n Robert M. Hull is an Associate Professor of Finance at Washburn University. In this paper, I extend the stock-for-debt research by investigating whether stock value is influenced by how a firm changes its leverage ratio in relationship to its industry leverage ratio norm. I find that announcement-period stock returns for firms moving “away from” industry debt-to-equity norms are significantly...

This paper develops a real options model of imperfect competition with asymmetric information that analyzes firms’ exit decisions. Optimal exit decision is linked to firm characteristics such as financial leverage and efficiency. The model shows that informational asymmetries between product market rivals can lead more efficient and less leveraged firms to leave the product market prematurely. ...

In this paper, we develop a model of dynamic capital structure choice based on a sample of Korean manufacturing firms and estimate the unobservable optimal capital structure using a wide range of observable determinants. Uunbalanced panel data of Korean listed firms for the period 1985 to 2002 is used. In addition to identifying and estimating the effects of the determinants of capital structur...

The banks’ response to their changes in leverage ratios is examined and evaluated in this paper. This reaction can be interpreted as if the coefficient of total debts to equity (lev1) and total assets to equity (lev2) are positive as anticipated in the banking network of Iran. The paper uses data from 31 Iranian banks’ annual databases during the course of 2006-13 in order to estimate an empiri...

This paper provides a theory of endogenous leverage through rehypothecation in collateralized intermediation. Overcollateralization with an rehypothecation option arises as an optimal contract form between broker dealers and their clients to mitigate adverse selection on collateral quality. Such contract prevents the broker dealers from taking advantage of private information on collateral qual...

This study investigates the effect of intra-organizational and macroeconomic factors on banking leverage in selected Iranian banks. For this purpose, after calculation of the Banking Leverage for each bank, by using Random-Coefficients Approach (Swamy model), the impact of explanatory variables during the period of 1999-2016 was examined separately by 10 selected Iranian public and private bank...

We consider a model in which banks face two moral hazard problems: 1) asset substitution by shareholders, which can occur when banks make socially-inefficient, risky loans; and 2) managerial under-provision of effort in loan monitoring. The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is neither too low nor too high: It efficiently balances the market discipline that owners of risky debt impose on ...