This paper measures excess labor supply in equilibrium. We induce hiring shocks—which employ 24 percent of the force external month-long jobs—in Indian local markets. In peak months, wages increase instantaneously and aggregate employment declines. lean consistent with severe rationing, are unchanged, positive spillovers on remaining workers, indicating that over a quarter is rationed. At least...

D pricing offers the potential to increase revenues. At the same time, it creates an incentive for customers to strategize over the timing of their purchases. A firm should ideally account for this behavior when making its pricing and stocking decisions. In particular, we investigate whether it is optimal for a firm to create rationing risk by deliberately understocking products. Then, the resu...

The equitable division of a joint cost (or a jointly produced output) among agents with different shares or types of output (or input) commodities, is a central theme of the theory of cooperative games with transferable utility. Ever since Shapley’s seminal contribution in 1953, this question has generated some of the deepest axiomatic results of modern microeconomic theory. More recently, the ...

This paper studies the problem of allocating utility losses among n agents with cardinal non-comparable utility functions. This problem is referred to as the Nash rationing problem, as it can be regarded as the translation of the Nash bargaining problem to a rationing scenario. We show that there is no single-valued solution satisfying the obvious reformulation of Nash’s axioms, nor a multivalu...

In this paper, we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that (1) #rms need outside #nancing and (2) they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks. We characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing, where #rms choose not to take risks, and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing. In both cases, we show that compe...