Much of the recent literature on reasons is focused on a common range of issues, concerning, for example, the relation between reasons and motivation, desires, and values, the issue of internalism versus externalism in the theory of reasons, or the objectivity or reasons. This paper is concerned with a different, and orthogonal, set of questions: What are reasons, and how do they support action...

Background and Purpose—Stroke is an important contributor to maternal morbidity and mortality, but there are no recent data on trends in pregnancy-related hospitalizations that have involved a stroke. This report describes stroke hospitalizations for women in the antenatal, delivery, and postpartum periods from 1994 to 1995 to 2006 to 2007 and analyzes the changes in these hospitalizations over...

I discuss two arguments against the view that reasons are propositions. I consider responses to each argument, including recent responses due to Mark Schroeder, and suggest further responses of my own. In each case, the discussion proceeds by comparing reasons to answers and goals.

In this paper I develop a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein’s infinitism. The view I develop, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein’s principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the ‘reason for’ relation is constrained by PAA and PAC can avoid an infinite regr...

How should we understand reasons-based knowledge? According to the counterfactual or modal account of conclusive reasons, famously defended by Dretske, R is conclusive for P just in case [R would not be the case unless P were the case]. I argue that while knowing is plausibly related to having conclusive reasons to believe, having such reasons cannot be understood in terms of the obtaining of t...