abstract a quantitative framework of combination of liner programming and cooperative game theory was used in this study to analyze and model cooperative contracts in production based on rural households' resources cooperation in firoozabad plain. revenues and costs in cooperation game theory have important rule to get agreement. transaction cost function was used in cooperative costs accountin...

We study stochastic dynamic investment games in continuous time between two investors (players) who have available two different, but possibly correlated, investment opportunities. There is a single payoff function which depends on both investors’ wealth processes. One player chooses a dynamic portfolio strategy in order to maximize this expected payoff while his opponent is simultaneously choo...

Abstract This article studies the decentralized adoption of a technology standard when network effects are present. If new is incompatible with current installed base, may be inefficiently delayed. I quantify magnitude “excess inertia” in switch movie distribution and exhibition industries from 35 mm film to digital. specify estimate dynamic game digital hardware by theatres movies supply distr...

game theory is an approach based on mathematics to study social interactions and modeling strategic situations. this theory focuses on decision situations where preferences of decision makers are disputed. existence of strategic position in city also with a conflict of interest or competition makes using game theory to describe the urban management issues, attractive. one of the important contr...

duopoly game theory is applied to the wood industrial markets (sawnwood and pulpwood markets) in the north of iran. the nash equilibrium and the dynamic properties of the system based on marginal adjustments are determined. the probability that the nash equilibrium will be reached is almost zero. the dynamical properties of sawnwood and pulpwood prices derived via the duopoly game model are fou...

We study repeated irreversible investment. We assume that ex ante ownership rights are incomplete and ex post property allocation is endogenous. In a stage game, principal can renege on ex ante contract with agents (investors). To capture that ownership rights depend on prior arrangements, we introduce a dynamic game, in which player ex ante ownership shares are equal to their ex post shares in...

We use in this paper the viability/capturability approach for studying the problem of characterizing the dynamic core of a dynamic cooperative game defined in a characteristic function form. In order to allow coalitions to evolve, we embed them in the set of fuzzy coalitions. Hence, we define the dynamic core as a set-valued map associating with each fuzzy coalition and each time the set of all...