We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. We first show that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games by providing alternative solutions that satisfy these axioms. However, when considering an assignment game as a communication graph game where th...

In markets where buyers cannot observe the quality of sellers’ goods, there may be a role for intermediation. A certi...cation intermediary is an agent that gathers information about seller quality and reports it to buyers. This paper examines the choice of such an intermediary between selling guidebooks to buyers, privately informing them about seller quality, and selling certi...cates to the ...

We examine a stylized version of EPA auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers. Sellers and buyers behave strategically. We show that there are two types of equilibria: inefficient equilibria where no goods are traded and efficient equilibria where alI exchange occurs at a uniform price. We also provide examples of the EPA auction game under incomplete information when ...

In a standard sequential pricing game, I model how buyers attend to information about product quality when prices are easily observable using ìrational inattentionî theory (Sims [2003]). Rational inattention in this setting produces two possible equilibria: one where the entire surplus goes to buyers and one where most of the surplus goes to sellers of high quality goods. I show that there are ...

Credence goods, such as car repairs or medical services, are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers, leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service (undertreatment), provision of unnecessary service (overtreatment) and charging too much for a given service (overcharging). Recent experimental research involving a standard (student) subj...

Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that revealing a complete or partial ordering of the different goods by value can be credible. Ordinal cheap talk of this form is not susceptible to exaggeration because it simultaneou...

Previous research in the area of buyer strategies for choosing sellers in ecommerce markets has focused on frequent purchases. In this paper we present a reputation based buyer strategy for choosing sellers in a decentralized, open, uncertain, dynamic, and untrusted B2C ecommerce market for frequent and infrequent purchases. The buyer models the reputation of the seller after having purchased g...

We study endogenous currency substitution in a decentralized trade environment. Sellers maximize profits from sales of imperfectly substitutable goods by posting prices in either one of two currencies. A unique symmetric equilibrium exists where goods are priced only in the local currency. This occurs if foreign trade is sporadic, there is sufficient but not excessive liquidity, and discounting...

The Internet provides an unprecedented capability for sellers to learn about their customers and offer custom products at special prices. Advanced manufacturing technologies have improved sellers’ manufacturing flexibility. To examine how these advances affect sellers’ products and pricing, we first develop a model of product customization and flexible pricing to incorporate the salient roles o...

In markets with asymmetric information, only sellers have knowledge about the quality of goods. Sellers may of course make a declaration of the quality, but unless there are sanctions imposed on false declarations or reputations are at stake, such declarations are tantamount to cheap talk. Nonetheless, in an experimental study we find that most people make honest declarations, which is in line ...