threat to use military force against iran has been repeated by us. these threats have been along with increasing sanctions and embargo against iran. the question we address in this paper is: what is the impact of on military threats against iran on effectiveness of sanctions and embargo against it? we will examine this hypothesis: in situation of global economy, transforming of military option ...

Uniqueness has a positive and attractive connotation, but being too unique can result in social sanctions. This paper focuses on the dual role of consumers’ need for uniqueness. The findings of two studies in Israel support the notion that expressing uniqueness via consumption behavior is a safe way to achieve a different sense of being without damaging an individual’s sense of social assimilat...

This chapter surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of the analysis addresses the following basic questions: Should the form of the sanction imposed on a liable party be a fine, an imprisonment term, or a combination of ...

While some observers continue to argue that “sanctions never work,” we agree with most scholars that the key question is when, not whether, sanctions work. What types of goals are relatively more likely to be advanced with economic sanctions? Which targets are most vulnerable? How should sanctions be imposed to maximize effectiveness? In this chapter we describe the framework we use to address ...

This paper examines the impact of sanctions on trade, and how international relations influences the welfare implications of sanctions. Sanctions intend to punish target countries by inhibiting them from the gains from trade. The e↵ect of sanctions depends on not only the bilateral impact on trade but how much trade is diverted to other countries. I decompose international trade by the types of...

This paper examines the interaction between legal and reputational sanctions in the design of an optimal deterrence regime, particularly in a setting where two parties are engaged in a long-term relationship (a “relational contract” setting). The paper makes three claims. First, both legal and reputational sanctions are costly: legal sanctions require spending resources on litigation while repu...

Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes treatments where a reward o...

We review recent work at the interface of economic game theory and evolutionary biology that provides new insights into the evolution of partner choice, host sanctions, partner fidelity feedback and public goods. (1) The theory of games with asymmetrical information shows that the right incentives allow hosts to screen-out parasites and screen-in mutualists, explaining successful partner choice...

Social norms involve observation by others and external sanctions for violations, while moral norms involve introspection and internal sanctions. We develop a simple model of individual preferences that incorporates moral and social norms. We then examine dictator choices, where we create a shared understanding by providing advice from peers with no financial payoff at stake. We vary whether ad...