Modeling the competition among telecommunication operators (or providers) as a repeated game may explain why tacit collusion to maintain high charging prices can be observed. Such outcomes clearly do not benefit the users, nor do they provide operators with incentives to improve the network quality of service to outperform their competitors. We propose a simple regulation based on price stabili...

The relationship between product differentiation and tacit collusion has been analyzed by Deneckere (1983,1984). For Cournot games, he assumed that collusion is supported by the threat of reverting to the equilibrium of the one shot game. Recently, Abreu (1986) has, however, derived the optimal punishment schemes for a wide range of repeated games. The purpose of the present paper is to analyze...

In this comment the survey by Feuerstein is taken as a point of departure to discuss some of the key challenges facing collusion theory in its application to competition and trade policy. The main issue is one of robustness. It is discussed that the popular use of equilibria with Nash reversion leads to highly non-robust results and contrasts this with a recent approach aimed at detecting robus...

The paper considers tacit collusion in markets which are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which …rm to purchase from, and each …rm only detects the other …rm’s price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while it increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion...

It is shown that R & D joint ventures make it more likely that firms will be able to sustain tacit product-market collusion, all else equal. JEL classification: LI3; 032