The Internet revolution has resulted in increased competition among providers of goods and services to lure customers by tearing down the barriers of time and distance. For example, a home buyer shopping for a mortgage loan through the Internet is now a potential customer for a large number of lending institutions throughout the world. The lenders (players, in generic game theory nomenclature) ...

We study existence of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria (NE) in pure positional strategies in finite positional n-person games with perfect information and terminal payoffs. However, these games may have moves of chance and cycles. Yet, we assume that All Infinite Plays Form One Outcome a∞, in addition to the set of Terminal outcomes VT . This assumption will be called the AIPFOOT condition. Fo...

In this paper we study the N-player nonzero-sumDynkin game (N ≥ 3) in continuous time, which is a non-cooperative game where the strategies are stopping times. We show that the game has a Nash equilibrium point for general payoff processes. AMS Classification subjects: 91A15 ; 91A10 ; 91A30 ; 60G40 ; 91A60.

We consider two populations co-evolving with fitness defined by the payoff in a two-person zero-sum game. We show that such situations lead to spontaneous and sustained oscillations iff the optimal strategy of the game is mixed.

We study a nonzero-sum game of two players which is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel of discrete type. The game is considered from the point of view of various criterions of optimality. We prove existence of ε-equilibrium situations and show that the ε-equilibrium strategies that we have found are ε-maxmin. Conditions under which the equilibrium plays are Pareto-optimal are given.