The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist–internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internal...

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution , reselling , loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to da...

The present study has a cognitive approach to empathy and character engagement in cinema. In discussing how through empathy and engagement with real and fictional characters, we extend our minds and enhance our cognitive abilities, the present paper studies Bahram Tavakkoli’s Wandering in the Fog (2010), to show how Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s idea of the extended mind as joined with ...

I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called ‘externalist’ theory of empirical content, on which the contents of a person’s beliefs are determined in part by the nature of his extra-bodily environment, with a plausible account of self-knowledge, in particular, of a person’s knowledge of the contents of his own beliefs. A difficulty for this combination is thought to be that it pro...

In this paper, I shall discuss a problem that arises when you try to combine an attractive account of what constitutes evidence with an independently plausible account of the kind of access we have to our evidence. According to E=K, our evidence consists of what we know. According to the principle of armchair access, we can know from the armchair what our evidence is. Combined, these claims ent...

Standard interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism take it as a 1 commitment to the view that the objects of cognition are structured or made by con2 ditions imposed by the mind, and therefore to what Van Cleve calls “honest-to-God 3 idealism”. Against this view, many more recent investigations of Kant’s theory of rep4 resentation and cognitive significance have been able to show that K...

a SPECIAL ISSUE II, pp. 45 – 53, 2008 INTENTIONALITY AND THE EXTERNALISM VERSUS INTERNALISM DEBATE