The increased attention of E-auction services in mobile E-commerce demands an approach to identify the relevant auctions as per the bidder’s requirements so as to increase the bidder satisfaction level and auction winning probability. In this paper, we propose an intelligent agent based model to identify the relevant set of auctions for a mobile bidder based on the bidder’s requirements, prefer...

This paper analyzes the internal bribery records made available for research by an Asian trading firm. It documents pervasive corruption in government procurement and evaluates the impact of different auction regulations. The average kickback was 14.7% of the product cost when auctions were not mandatory. To fight corruption, the government mandated best-value auctions in 2001, and strengthened...

A consumer may be interested in buying a bundle of items, where any one item in the bundle may not be of particular interest. The emergence of online auctions allows such users to obtain bundles by bidding on different simultaneous or sequentially run auctions. Because the number of auctions and the number of combinations to form the bundles may be large, the bundle bidding problem becomes intr...

Online-auctions are one of the most successful types of electronic markets. They bring together buyers and sellers on a massive scale. However, using an electronic medium for conducting auctions has fundamental differences from traditional English-style auctions. One difference is the availability of software agents that can facilitate many aspects of online-auction participation. The addition ...

R on bidding in auctions has generally relied on the assumption of self-interested bidders. This work relaxes that assumption in the context of charity auctions. Because understanding charitable motives has important implications for auction design and charities’ fundraising strategies, this study investigates bidders’ specific types of charitable motives and the strength of these motives. We c...

3 Examples of VCG mechanisms 5 3.1 Single-item auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2 Auctions of identical items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3 Procurement auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4 Public project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than either winner-pay auctions or lotteries. We demonstrate that first-price and second-price winnerpay auctions have a better revenue performance than first-price and second-price all-pay auctions when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. Lotteries can also provide higher revenue than all-pay auctions. To prove thi...

A common approach to analyzing repeated auctions, such as sponsored search auctions, is to treat them as complete information games, because it is assumed that, over time, players learn each other’s types. This overlooks the possibility that players may impersonate another type. In this paper, we show that many standard auctions, including the Kelly mechanism, generalized second price auctions,...

Theorists have long believed that Dutch auctions are strategically equivalent to standard sealed bidding. However, recently in controlled experiments with actual Dutch and sealed bid Internet auctions of collectables, the Dutch auctions produced significantly more revenue. We believe that this happened, in part, because the Internet Dutch auctions are a slow process in which bidders incur incre...