We study a finite-depositor version of the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation in which the bank and all depositors observe withdrawals as they occur. We derive the (constrained) efficient allocation of resources in closed-form and show that this allocation provides liquidity insurance to depositors. The contractual arrangement that decentralizes this allocation has debt-like featu...

We consider a closed economy where a risk neutral bank competes with a competitive bond market. Firms can finance a risky project either by a bank credit or by issuing a bond which is directly sold to risk averse investors who also hold safe deposits at the bank. We show that the bank tends to allocate more capital to lower quality projects but there are some interesting qualifications. If the ...

We consider a closed economy where a risk neutral bank competes with a competitive bond market. Firms can finance a risky project either by a bank credit or by issuing a bond which is directly sold to risk averse investors who also can hold safe deposits at the bank. We show that a monopolistic bank tends to allocate more capital to lower quality projects but there are some interesting qualific...

U ninsured depositors, whose deposits are not fully protected by federal deposit insurance, have an incentive to monitor banks' activities and impose additional funding costs on risky banks. This pricing is a form of market discipline, since the market penalizes banks for taking on greater risk. For banks that become troubled, market discipline can take a more severe form: Market participants m...

Th e fi nancial regulation architecture in both the United States and China developed during eras when retail deposits and bank loans were the primary mode of fi nancial intermediation. Th e function of banks is to transform short-term deposits into long-term loans, while providing liquidity for depositors. Experience has taught regulators hard lessons that this activity must be subject to prud...

The growth in the interest rates paid on Spanish public debt since 2008 and the impairment of the interbank market have generated concerns about their effects on competition for bank deposits in Spain. I combine a nested logit model of bank deposit supply with a structural model of competition to measure the impact of the reference interest rates on public debt and interbank markets on the retu...

T he present paper investigates the impact of the financial crisis on the interaction between the lending rates, deposit rates and money market rates through the process of retail bank interest rate pass-through in the countries of the Euro area. Among our findings is the heterogeneity of bank rate adjustments across sectors, loans and deposits. That was mainly marked during the pre-...

Identifying banking crises is the first step in the research on determinants of banking crises. The prevailing practice is to employ market events to identify a banking crisis. Researchers justify the usage of this method on the grounds that either direct and reliable indicators of banks’ assets quality are not available, or that withdrawals of bank deposits are no longer a part of financial cr...