Abstract   Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is typically a cost sharing mechanism and coordinated effort by the channel’s members in order to increase demand and overall profits. In this marketing strategy, the manufacturer shares a fraction of the retailer’s advertising investment. This paper studies the advertising and pricing decisions in a retailer-manufacturer supply chain in which...

This paper offers a noncooperative behaviourally-founded solution of the complete information bargaining problem where two impatient individuals wish to divide a unit pie. We formulate the game in continuous time, with unrestricted timing and content of offers. Reprising experimental work from 1960, we introduce and explore aspirational equilibrium — a Markovian refinement of subgame perfection...

game theory is an approach based on mathematics to study social interactions and modeling strategic situations. this theory focuses on decision situations where preferences of decision makers are disputed. existence of strategic position in city also with a conflict of interest or competition makes using game theory to describe the urban management issues, attractive. one of the important contr...

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and effici...

We consider two-person bargaining games with interdependent preferences and bilateral incomplete information. We show that in both the ultimatum game and the two-stage alternating-offers game, our equilibrium predictions are consistent with a number of robust experimental regularities that falsify the standard game-theoretic model: occurrence of disagreements, disadvantageous counteroffers, and...

Bargaining behavior occupies an important part in economics literature, or social sciences in general. Although there is an extensive simulation literature on social tradeoff in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the one-shot bargaining game, little has been done for the repeated bargaining game. Part of reason for this neglect is that, despite having a continuum of Nash equilibria, under homogeneous s...

Nash’s (1950) theory and related theories of bargaining are frequently criticized for their lack of empirical content, since their predictions depend on the bargainers’ von :Jeumann-Morgenstern utility functions, which are not directly observable. The purpose of this letter is to suggest that an approach recently taken by Kurz (1977, 1978) in a somewhat different context may provide a remedy fo...

In the present chapter we introduce several generalizations to the formulation and solution of the bargaining problem. Until the early 1960s, the study of social power (including political power) had been carried out exclusively by social scholars. That changed in 1962, when Harsanyi managed to introduce the rigor of mathematical reasoning into the theory of social power. He achieved this by ap...

This paper shows that the Rubinstein alternating offers model can be modified to provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union-firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the union and the firm engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show th...

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.