We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (PérezCastrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents. JEL Classification numbers: C72, D50, D63.

Article history: Received 16 November 2009 Received in revised form 12 August 2010 Accepted 20 August 2010 Available online 21 October 2010 JEL classification: C72 C92 D80 D84

This note demonstrates that a result on evolutionary stability, presented by Bester and Güth (1998), applies under more general preference and payoff functions. JEL Classification: C72; A13

We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; D43; L13

We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the constituent games. JEL classification: C72; C73; C78.

We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. JEL classification: D72, D74, D82, C72

An overview is given of the utilization of strategic market games in the development of a game theory based theory of money and financial institutions. JEL Classifications: C72, C73, E44

How to compensate people who provide relevant information to a decision-maker who faces uncertainty? This paper suggests some compensation rules. These are studied both in a cooperative and a noncooperative environment. JEL codes: C71, C72, D89.

We generalize two existence results for pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games provided by Schmeidler (1973) and Le Breton and Weber (1997). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.