It is proved that the core in a general setting for cooperative games is equal to the set of subgame perfect equilibria of a noncooperative game of competing contracts. A coalitional deviation in a cooperative game corresponds to, in the noncooperative game, the involved agents’ participation in a contract proposed by a deviating principal. ∗Department of Economics, Iowa State University, 260 H...

This paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is proved that the super-additive, and grand coalition effectively increases global payoff. also model balanced thus, it has nonempty core. means there always exists at least one mechanism makes stable. Therefore, prosumers will achieve lower bills if they join to form larger ECs. A counterexample presented...

In the theory of cooperative transferable utilities games, (TU games), the Efficient Values, that is those which show how the win of the grand coalition is shared by the players, may not be a good solution to give a fair outcome to each player. In an earlier work of the author, the Inverse Problem has been stated and explicitely solved for the Shapley Value and for the Least Square Values. In t...

Cooperative localization under complex urban environments has become a solution able to replace Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) positioning. Due the lack of an efficient cooperative scheme, traditional vehicle networks result in high computational complexity and heavy communication overhead. In this paper, we concentrate on design vehicle. This paper proposes method based evolutionary...

Pure bargaining games discussed in the previous two lectures are a special case of n-person cooperative games. In the general setup coalitions other than the grand coalition matter as well. The primitive is the coalitional form (or, "coalitional function", or "characteristic form"). The primitive can represent many different things, e.g., a simple voting game where we associate to a winning coa...

Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The possible representations of simple games considered are simple games represented by winning coalitions, minimal winning coalitions, weighted voting game or a multip...

We consider the problem of computing the influence of a neuronal structure in a brain network. Abraham et al. (2006) computed this influence by using the Shapley value of a coalitional game corresponding to a directed network as a rating. Kötter et al. (2007) applied this rating to large-scale brain networks, in particular to the macaque visual cortex and the macaque prefrontal cortex. Our aim ...

In this paper we motivate a new approach to analyse the computational complexity of solution concepts and playerbased properties, as well as other properties of coalitional games. This approach is based on the idea to abstract away from detailed game representations to analyse games via standard complexity proofs, towards a more abstract approach, where games are analysed by focusing on influen...

The application of device-to-device (D2D) communication in cellular networks can significantly improve the efficiency of spectrum utilization, which benefits local area cooperative services. On the other hand, network coding can realize more efficient cooperation among cellular users. Thus, it is natural to combine network coding with D2D communication in order to further increase the system su...