In this paper we provide a philosophical analysis of the Hard Problem consciousness and implications conceivability scenarios for current neuroscientific research. particular, focus on one most prominent theories consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT). After brief introduction IIT, present Chalmers’ original formulation propose our own layered view hard problem, showing how 2 separa...

We ask how to use machine learning expand observability, which presently depends on human that informs conceivability. The issue is engaged by considering the question of correspondence between conceived observability counterfactuals and observable, yet so far unobserved or unconceived, states affairs. A possible answer lies in importing out reference frame content could provide means for conce...

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts...

This paper is a companion to “Sensory Awareness is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument against Externalist Intentionalism” (forthcoming, with a reply by Michael Tye, in Nous). I generalize the argument of that previous paper. I attempt to show that, given the mild form of Internalism argued for in the previous paper, it is not only the case that the awareness relation cannot be ...

oppenheimer and zalta, in a co-authored paper, argue that the anselm’s ontological argument can be formalized based on free logic and the concept of conceivability. according to their version, there are only two premises in anselm’s argument. we will argue that one can extend their formalization by introducing an argument for one of the two premises based on anselm’s text. we will also show tha...

Since the time of Descartes, various versions a modal argument have been proffered for substance dualism. Until recently, premise most frequently attacked is one that moves from conceivability to metaphysical possibility. However, more new criticism has surfaced, viz., an contingent physicalism. The purpose this article show what I take be sophisticated physicalist fails as defeater argument. A...