Demonstrating the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss three different approaches to proof or check such property in regard of a multi-attribute auction mechanism: by analyzing well-known sufficient conditions, by mathematical analyzing the rules that govern the mechanism, and by empirically che...

Investors’ Exchange LLC (IEX) is a newly approved public exchange that is designed to discourage aggressive high-frequency trading. We explain how IEX differs from traditional continuous double auction markets and present summary data on IEX transactions by trader class and order type. Our primary contribution is a simple analytic model of IEX as a constrained version of the continuous double a...

Grid computing, emerging as a new paradigm for next-generation computing, enables the sharing, selection, and aggregation of geographically distributed heterogeneous resources for solving large-scale problems in science, engineering, and commerce. The resources in the Grid are heterogeneous and geographically distributed. The paper demonstrates the capability of economicbased systems for wide-a...

The advent of the Internet and the development of the Next Generation Network (NGN) have enabled the development of value added services (VAS), while operators’ investments in licenses and their desire to stay competitive on the market have triggered the development. When forming VAS, special attention needs to be paid to the purchase of resources (e.g., transport capacity and content) needed f...

In this paper we describe an analysis, using evolutionary game theory, of two double auction markets—the clearing house auction and the continuous double auction. We use heuristic-strategy approximation to analyse two broad classes of traders. One heuristic strategy approximates human behavior, and the other is a simple automated strategy, so our analysis permits us to predict the evolution of ...

In this paper, we suggest using an English Auction Protocol for a procurement multi-attribute auction in which the item for sale is defined by several attributes, the buyer agent is the auctioneer, and the seller agents are the bidders. Such domains include auctions on task allocation, services, or compound products. At the beginning of the auction the buyer agent announces the required propert...