In this article we revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition in the presence of a cartel of firms that faces outsiders acting individually. This competition setting enables to deal with both non-cooperative and cooperative oligopoly games. We concentrate on industries consisting of symmetrically differentiated products where firms operate at a constant and identica...

Abstract We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time where players are characterized by time-evolving types. It is natural assumption that the players’ actions cannot anticipate future values of their Such games go under name Cournot-Nash equilibria , and were first studied Acciaio et al. (SIAM J Control Optim 59:2273–2300, 2021), as time/information dependent version devised B...

In this paper, we study an incomplete information dynamical system. Then, we suggest a modification of this system and we applied it to the standard Cournot game. The equilibrium solutions and the conditions of their locally asymptotic stability for the static and the dynamic in monopoly and duopoly cases are studied. Also, we formulate and study the multi-team dynamic Cournot game. (C) 2012 El...

We consider three models of investments in generation capacity in restructured electricity systems that differ by their underlying economic assumptions. The first model assumes a perfect, competitive equilibrium. It is very similar to the old capacity expansion models even if its economic interpretation is different. The second model (open-loop Cournot game) extends the Cournot model to include...

We consider Cournot models of competition, where market participants choose the quantities they demand or supply. We study the loss of aggregate surplus due to the exercise of market power in Cournot competition, for both oligopsony and oligopoly models. We observe that efficiency loss is generally arbitrarily high in Cournot games, but also prove bounds on efficiency loss in several cases of i...

An adaptive oligopoly model, where the demand function is isoelastic and the competitors operate under constant marginal costs, is considered. The Cournot equilibrium point then loses stability through a subcritical Neimark bifurcation. The present paper focuses some global bifurcations, which precede the Neimark bifurcation, and produce other attractors which coexist with the still attractive ...