In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of firstprice auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs a...

This paper provides a characterization of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise a common cost. The advantage of the dynamic analysis over existing static models is that it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organization: qu...

An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history. Under very general conditions, it tends to exhibi...

We illustrate two di¤erential oligopoly games using, respectively, the capital accumulation dynamics à la Nerlove-Arrow, and the capital accumulation dynamics à la Ramsey. We prove that these games bene...t from the property that closed-loop memoryless solutions degenerate into open-loop solutions, since the best reply of a generic ...rm is independent of the rivals’ state variables, which enta...

We prove existence of mixed strategy equilibria for a class of discontinuous two-player games with non-compact strategy sets. As a corollary of our main results, we obtain a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria for the firstand second-price two-bidder auctions with toeholds. We also find Klemperer’s (2000) result about the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in the classical Bertrand duopo...

We study financial intermediation in which sufficient sorting is impossible. We identify a new type of market failure that may occur even when returns of investing entrepreneurs are verifiable. Moreover, we suggest that the nature of competition determines the contracts banks offer. A monopoly bank will offer equity contracts. In any pure strategy equilibrium when lenders compete à la Bertrand,...

This paper explores the effects of a goods and services tax on the degree of competition in an oligopolistic industry and identifies a new mechanism through which the tax influences product market competition. The analysis focuses upon the effects of the tax in a concentrated industry and it is demonstrated that there exist circumstances under which the tax may promote competition by rendering ...

Drawing a conclusion from recent insights in evolutionary game theory, we show that a so-called spite e!ect implies that there is an essential di!erence between individual and social learning. We illustrate its consequences for the choice of computational tools in economics and social settings in general by analyzing two variants of a Genetic Algorithm. ( 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights r...

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiring a company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition of both, buyers and sellers. Näıvety of both is related to the idea that higher prices exclude worse qualities. While competition of näıve buyers increases prices, competition of näıve sellers promotes efficiency enhancing trade. Our predictions are teste...

We extend Armstrong’s [1] result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models providing support for the view that the result holds true in a large class of models. We first relax some of the strong technical assumptions he imposed and provide alternative su cient conditions for exclusion not relying on any form of convexity. We then proceed to show that exclusion obtains generically. We i...