Rasmussen and Čapkun recently presented the first practical realization of an RFbased distance bounding protocol. By using the technique of Challenge Reflection with Channel Selection (CRCS), they can reduce the prover’s processing delay to less than 1 ns. In this article, we demonstrate that their protocol is vulnerable to a relay attack, in which the adversary delays the start of the switchin...

Distance bounding protocols enable a device to establish an upper bound on the physical distance to a communication partner so as to prevent location spoofing, as exploited by relay attacks. Recently, Rasmussen and Čapkun (ACM-CCS’08) observed that these protocols leak information on the location of the parties to external observers, which is undesirable in a number of applications—for example ...

Terrorist fraud is a class of relay attacks against distancebounding (DB) protocols in which a distant malicious prover colludes with an attacker located in a verifier’s proximity when authenticating. Existing DB protocols resisting such attacks are designed to be lightweight and thus symmetric, relying on a secret shared by the prover and the verifier. Recently, several asymmetric distance-bou...

During the last years, researchers have focused on designing secure and efficient RFID authentication protocols. The vast majority of these protocols assume proximity between readers and tags due to the limited range of the radio channel. However, in real scenarios, an intruder can be located between the prover (tag) and the verifier (reader) and trick the latter into thinking that the prover i...

Authentication for resource-constrained devices is seen as one of the major challenges in current wireless communication networks. The HB protocol performs device authentication based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem and simple computational steps, that renders it suitable for resource-constrained devices such as radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. However, it has been sh...

Distance (upper)-bounding (DUB) allows a verifier to know whether a proving party is located within a certain distance bound. DUB protocols have many applications in secure authentication and location based services. We consider the dual problem of distance lower bounding (DLB), where the prover proves it is outside a distance bound to the verifier. We motivate this problem through a number of ...

Almost all existing RFID tag/reader authentication protocols are vulnerable to mafia attacks and/or terrorist attacks from adversaries because of their inability to verify location of the tag. Several protocols have been proposed that purport to alleviate these forms of attacks. However, vulnerabilities have been identified in most of these protocols. We present and evaluate a modified distance...

In this paper we consider the problem of securely measuring distance between two nodes in a wireless sensor network. The problem of measuring distance has fundamental applications in both localization and time synchronization, and thus would be a prime candidate for subversion by hostile attackers. We give a brief overview and history of protocols for secure distance bounding. We also give the ...