This paper describes a study designed to understand player responses to artificially intelligent opponents in multi-player First Person Shooter games. It examines the player‟s ability to tell the difference between artificially intelligent opponents and other human players, and investigates the players‟ perceptions of these opponents. The study examines player preferences in this regard and ide...

We consider a strategic situation in which each player may not know the probability distribution governing the information structures of his opponents, and consequently his beliefs about opponents' action choices are represented by a set of probability measures. Suppose that beliefs of all the players are common knowledge. Then for any subset of players, the marginal beliefs of those players (a...

We propose that individuals use anger strategically in interactions. We first show that in some environments angering people makes them more effective in competitions, whereas in others, anger makes them less effective. We then show that individuals anticipate these effects and strategically use the option to anger their opponents. In particular, they are more likely to anger their opponents wh...

Research in competitive games has exclusively focused on how opponent models are developed through previous outcomes and how peoples' decisions relate to normative predictions. Little is known about how rapid impressions of opponents operate and influence behavior in competitive economic situations, although such subjective impressions have been shown to influence cooperative decision-making. T...

One of the most important contributions made by Dreger’s article is her description of the extraordinary lengths to which some of Bailey’s male-to-female (MtF) transsexual opponents went in their attempts to discredit him, his book, and his ideas. By Dreger’s account, their campaign against Bailey continued for at least two years after the publication of The Man Who Would Be Queen (TMWWBQ; Bail...

Level-k theories are agnostic over whether individuals stop the iterated reasoning because of their own cognitive constraints, or because of their beliefs over the cognitive constraints of their opponents. In practice, individual level of play may be a function both of their own constraints and their beliefs over their opponents’ reasoning process. Moreover, the rounds of introspection that pla...