The Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience states that microphysical duplicates cannot differ in their intrinsic properties. According to Merricks (Mind 107(425):59–71, 1998a, Objects and persons, Oxford University Press, 2001), however, this thesis is false, since can with respect the property consciousness. In my view, Merricks’ argument plausible, extant attempts reject it are problematic. ...

Non-naturalists realists about morality face the challenge of explaining supervenience moral facts on natural facts. An influential recent suggestion, developed by Scanlon (2014) and Fogal Risberg (2020), is that non-naturalist can easily explain appealing to explanatory principles, or metaphysical laws. The idea general principles are necessary so trivially supervene facts, while particular ex...

Co-location is compatible with the doctrine of microphysical supervenience. Microphysical supervenience involves intrinsic qualitative properties that supervene on microphysical structures. Two different objects, such as Socrates and the lump of tissue of which he is constituted, can be co-located objects that supervene on different sets of properties. Some of the properties are shared, but oth...

Filling in the schema requires specifying what it is for an entity to be physical, and what it is for an entity to be ‘‘nothing over and above’’ some other entities. Some have worried that no account of the physical is adequate for physicalist purposes; and I’ll soon say a bit about how physicalists have responded (in my view, successfully) to this worry. But my main focus here is on nothing ov...

Abstract Expressivism is supposed to have an advantage over moral realism, in that it can explain why a conceptual truth the supervenes on natural, even though natural does not entail moral. I develop analogy between expressivism and version of theistic argue this realism shares any might have. It may be alleged has overstated. Nevertheless, possible analogies received very little attention pas...