In a Volunteer's Dilemma (VoD) one individual needs to bear a cost so that a public good can be provided. Expectations regarding what others will do play a critical role because they would ideally be negatively correlated with own decisions; yet, a social-projection heuristic generates positive correlations. In a series of 2-person-dilemma studies with over 1,000 participants, we find that expe...

Children with special educational needs (SEN) are more likely to experience victimisation at school and there is some evidence to suggest that these children are also more likely to engage in bullying behaviours; however, no measure of bullying experiences has been designed specifically for use with these children. The Bullying Behaviour and Experiences Scale (BBES) was specifically developed a...

Actions taken by economic decision makers are typically predicated upon hypotheses or predictions about future states of a world that is itself in part the consequence of these hypotheses or predictions. When we attempt to model how such predictions might be generated we become stymied: the predictions some economic agents might form depend on the predictions they believe others might form; and...

Past research reveals a tension between children's preferences for egalitarianism and ingroup favoritism when distributing resources to others. Here we investigate how children's evaluations and expectations of others' behaviors compare. Four- to 10-year-old children viewed events where individuals from two different groups distributed resources to their own group, to the other group, or equall...

a contractual relationship is commonly based on statements, expectations, acts and omissions out of which some will, and others will not, give rise to contractual obligations. to avoid uncertainty as to what is agreed, the contract parties often enter into a written contract that is supposed to express the final agreement between them and prevent the parties from relying on rights and obligatio...

Why do announcements of public information set o¤ a frenzy of trading? Usually, public information brings beliefs closer to each other. With less disagreement, there should be less reason to trade. I highlight two novel properties of certain Gaussian information structures and show that they explain hectic and informative trading around announcements. First, announcements can lead to contrarian...