Opinion compromise models can give insight into how groups of individuals may either come to form consensus or clusters of opinion groups, corresponding to parties. We consider models where randomly selected individuals interact pairwise. If the opinions of the interacting agents are not within a certain confidence threshold, the agents retain their own point of view. Otherwise, they constructi...

Far-right extremist groups in Poland have undergone the substantive evolution over course of last thirty years – from being marginalized, small number group to one most developed and numerous movements civil society, as well on political landscape. The article examines history this movement, its stages development demonstrates how pivotal is role far-right Euroscepticism Poland.

SFI WORKING PAPER: 1997-06-059 SFI Working Papers contain accounts of scientific work of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Santa Fe Institute. We accept papers intended for publication in peer-reviewed journals or proceedings volumes, but not papers that have already appeared in print. Except for papers by our external faculty, papers must be based on work done at ...

Protected areas are increasingly prone to violent extremism spillover, with dramatic consequences for both local people and wildlife populations. Due the influence of extremist groups, science policy generally fade away. We outline case W-Arly-Pendjari complex protected in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger), 62% which is currently under control groups. The last large population African el...

Right-wing extremism is a serious problem in many societies. A prominent hypothesis states that unemployment plays a crucial role for the occurrence of right-wing extremist crime. In this paper we empirically test this hypothesis. We use a previously not used data set which includes all officially recorded right-wing criminal acts in Germany. These data are recorded by the German Federal Crimin...

We extend the ‘citizen candidate’ model of party formation to allow for aggregate uncertainty over the distribution of preferences. We discuss and characterize the equilibrium set in this framework and show that two-party equilibria have ‘extremist’ parties, i.e. the party winning under a left-wing (right-wing) distribution is to the left (right) of the median of that distribution.

Given a finite state space and common priors, common knowledge of the identity of an agent with the minimal (or maximal) expectation of a random variable implies “consensus”, i.e., common knowledge of common expectations. This “extremist” statistic induces consensus when repeatedly announced, and yet, with n agents, requires at most log2 n bits to broadcast.