Abstract A program verifier produces reliable results only if both the logic used to justify program’s correctness is sound, and implementation of itself correct. Whereas it common formally prove soundness logic, a typically remains unverified. Bugs in implementations may compromise trustworthiness successful verification results. Since verifiers practice are complex, evolving software systems,...

Severe low-level vulnerabilities abound in today’s computer systems, allowing cyber-attackers to remotely gain full control. This happens in big part because our programming languages, compilers, and architectures were designed in an era of scarce hardware resources and too often trade off security for efficiency. The semantics of mainstream low-level languages like C is inherently insecure, an...

OBJECTIVES To demonstrate a technology-based approach to continuously improving the safety of medical processes. METHODS The paper describes the Little-JIL process definition language, originally developed to support software engineering, and shows how it can be used to model medical processes. The paper describes a Little-JIL model of a chemotherapy process and demonstrates how this model, a...

Severe low-level vulnerabilities abound in today’s computer systems, allowing cyber-attackers to remotely gain full control. This happens in big part because our programming languages, compilers, and architectures were designed in an era of scarce hardware resources and too often trade off security for efficiency. The semantics of mainstream low-level languages like C is inherently insecure, an...

This paper proposes Formally Verifiable Networking (FVN), a novel approach towards unifying the design, specification, implementation, and verification of networking protocols within a logic-based framework. In FVN, formal logical statements are used to specify the behavior and the properties of the protocol. FVN uses declarative networking as an intermediary layer between high-level logical sp...

Severe low-level vulnerabilities abound in today’s computer systems, allowing cyber-attackers to remotely gain full control. This happens in big part because our programming languages, compilers, and architectures were designed in an era of scarce hardware resources and too often trade off security for efficiency. The semantics of mainstream low-level languages like C is inherently insecure, an...

Severe low-level vulnerabilities abound in today’s computer systems, allowing cyber-attackers to remotely gain full control. This happens in big part because our programming languages, compilers, and architectures were designed in an era of scarce hardware resources and too often trade off security for efficiency. The semantics of mainstream low-level languages like C is inherently insecure, an...

Severe low-level vulnerabilities abound in today’s computer systems, allowing cyber-attackers to remotely gain full control. This happens in big part because our programming languages, compilers, and architectures were designed in an era of scarce hardware resources and too often trade off security for efficiency. The semantics of mainstream low-level languages like C is inherently insecure, an...