We present a composition for solo classical guitar. This work comprises four pieces in 3/4 that share the same harmony, but restrictions differ each. The results are distinct "waltz" movements. main contribution of this is showing not as rooted inspiration, emotions, or innate talent process learning, critics, and performance. Also an example paradox choice, i.e., one may be more creative with ...

This is a study of the representations of subjective expected utility preferences that admit state-dependent incompleteness, and subjective expected utility preferences displaying non-comparability of acts from distinct sources. The notions familiar events and sources are defined and characterized. The relation greater familiarity on sources and increasing familiarity of a source are also defin...

Under expected utility, prudence is equivalent to a positive third derivative of utility and plays a crucial role in precautionary saving behaviour. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) proposed behavioural de nitions of prudence and of higher order risk preferences. The present paper proposes a similar de nition for prudence with respect to ambiguity, i.e., situations in which objective probabilit...

We study the effects of bidder collaboration in all-pay auctions. We analyse both mergers, where the remaining players are aware of the agreement between the cooperating participants, and collusion, where the remaining players are unaware of this agreement. We examine two scenarios: the sum-profit model where the auctioneer obtains the sum of all submitted bids, and the max-profit model of crow...

This talk will come in four parts. First, I will introduce the Riemann hypothesis (RH) as it was first introduced, using the Riemann zeta function, and discuss briefly its connection to number theory and prime numbers. Second, I will make this connection explicit by discussion a famous problem equivalent to RH. Third, I will examine the generalised Riemann hypothesis (GRH) and, finally, will li...

Introduction Propose and provide foundations for a preference model set in an explicitly dynamic framework with uncertainty where: DM is sensitive to ambiguity ambiguity attitude is separated from ambiguity ‡exibility in ambiguity attitude and in scope of ambiguity preferences are dynamically consistent discounted expected utility is a special case beliefs are updated over time

We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein’s (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers. Journal of Economic Literature Cl...