Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, (1989) suggest that the challenge of corporate governance is to set up supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk and effort orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals. Therefore, the objective of this study is to determine the efficiency of monitoring and incentive contracts given certain characteristics of the firm. That ...

CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly across Chinese cities. We show that city and provincial policy experiments help explain this variance. We examine the role of two policy experiments: the use of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and the rate at which state owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatised. CE...

We build a simple model to show that relationships and high-powered formal contracts can be either substitutes or complements, depending on the relative impact of relationships on incentive problems and contracting costs. Empirically, in the offshore drilling industry we find that oil and gas companies are less likely to choose high-powered fixed-price contracts as the intensity of their relati...

Sorting, Incentives and Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Field Experiment The, often observed, positive correlation between incentive intensity and risk has been explained in two ways: the presence of transaction costs as determinants of contracts and the sorting of risk-tolerant individuals into firms using high-intensity incentive contracts. The empirical importance of sorting is perhaps bes...

service oriented enterprises (soes) are subject to constant change and variation. in this paper, the changes are considered from an economic perspective based on service culture notion. once a change is implemented, the costs of some member services may increase, whereas the costs of some other services may reduce. we construct a game theoretic model trying to capture the possible conflicting i...