Using data spanning the 1996-1998 fiscal years of 247 of Japan’s largest manufacturers, we empirically evaluate the extent to which a firm’s investment behavior and financial performance is influenced by its ownership structure. To do so, we examine six distinct categories of Japanese shareholders: foreign investors, investment funds, pension funds, banks and insurance companies, affiliated com...

We investigate the analytical and empirical linkages between cash flow, uncertainty and firms’ capital investment behavior. Our empirical approach constructs measures of ownand market-specific uncertainty from firms’ daily stock returns and S&P 500 index returns along with a CAPM-based risk measure. Our results indicate that even in the presence of important firm-specific variables, uncertainty...

The thesis of this chapter is that evolutionary theory can make a major contribution to conceptualizing children's internalization of values. The paper is broadly divided into four sections: The first section develops an evolutionary framework in which internalization is a facet of high-investment parenting and is expected to co-vary with a number of other life history variables, including age ...

Received April 5, 2016 Revised May 10, 2016 Approved June 18, 2016 The financial surface of the globe at all times reveals a weird balanced impact of the public investment preferences, their understanding about the investment requirements, their anticipation of returns on their investments etc. Perhaps forecasting the growth of the business world would be crucial without an apposite comprehensi...

This paper experimentally investigates investment behavior. We find that global risk – i.e. risk independent of an agent’s investment decision (like political risk) – substantially decreases investment. Also, if the capital used for investment is based on previous earnings (effort) instead of an endowment, investment decreases substantially. These results are neither in line with expected utili...

We report results from an experiment based on a simplified version of Hart's (1995) property rights theory of the firm. Only one manager invests and this investment is completely specific. In that case the theory predicts that the level of investment is not affected by the level of no-trade payoffs if these payoffs are modeled as threat points (as Hart does). If instead no-trade payoffs are mod...