We present a logical relationship between a small number of intuitive properties for measures of belief and the axioms of probability theory. The relationship was first demonstrated several decades ago but has remained obscure. We introduce the proof and discuss its relevance to research on reasoning under uncertainty in artificial intelligence. In particular, we demonstrate that the logical re...

A formalism for the logical description of computational agents and multi-agent systems is given. It is explained how it such a formal description can be used to configure and reason about multi-agent systems realizing computational intelligence models. A usage within a real software system Bang 3 is demonstrated. The logical description of multi-agent systems opens Bang 3 for interaction with ...

The concept of “probabilistic logic” known in artificial intelligence needs a more thorough substantiation. A new approach to constructing probabilistic logic based on the N-tuple algebra developed by the author is proposed. A brief introduction is given to the N-tuple algebra and its properties that provide efficient paralleling of algorithms for solving problems of logical analysis of systems...

In this paper, we briefly describe recent research directions of the Artificial Intelligence group of the University of L'Aquila, Italy. Research activities concern Computational Logic and mainly Intelligent Logical Agents. In fact, in the last years the group has developed the logical agent-oriented language DALI. However, work is under way also in other areas, like, e.g., Non-Monotonic Reason...

New automatic theorem proving (ATP) techniques for application in control syst~nR and artificial intelligence is proposed. We consider new logical languages in descrip~ive and constructive semantics. These languages censist of 1-st c~der fc~muins with type quantifie~s. We de’he logical calculi of classical and intuitionistic types as well as strategies of automated reasoning. In. formation on r...

We distill Penrose’s argument against the “artificial intelligence premiss”, and analyze its logical alternatives. We then clarify the different positions one can take in answer to the question raised by the argument, skirting the issue of introspection per se.