This paper considers a supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. In such a market, a potential entrant can make a substitute product by imitating the incumbent's product and then sells it to the common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling through the incumbent's retailer, (ii) selling through another independent retailer, or (iii) selling d...

We explore the issue of supply chain coordination by considering trade credit and its risk. It shows that, in a retailer–manufacturer system, the manufacturer may deliver less than the retailer's order quantity when the payment is delayed, and the manufacturer's risk aversion makes this result hold in a wider range. These findings are different from the common sense believed in the retailer–man...

This paper investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for pricing and ordering decisions in a dominant retailer dual-channel supply chain. In a dual-channel sales network, the products are sold through both a traditional, physical retailer and a direct Internet channel. It is assumed that the retailer is the leader and the powerful member of the supply chain has the market power and acts as a lea...

In this paper, an inventory model for deterioration items in a two-echelon supply chain including one retailer and one manufacturer is proposed by considering the stock and price dependent demand and capacity constraint for holding inventories. First, the model is presented as a leader-follower game in which the manufacturer announces wholesale prices. Second, the retailer decides for the order...

This study investigates the channel coordination issue of a supply chain with a risk-neutral manufacturer and a loss-averse retailer facing stochastic demand that is sensitive to sales effort. Under the loss-averse newsvendor setting, a distribution-free gain/loss-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) contract has been shown to be able to coordinate the supply chain. However, we find that a GLB contract re...

We model a supply chain consisting of a national brand manufacturer and an independent manufacturer, both of whom are potential suppliers of store brand to a single retailer. The retailer serves two customer segments – a quality sensitive segment (high type) and a price sensitive (low type) segment. The retailer serves these two segments by targeting the national and store brands to the quality...

Studying the operational motivation of a retailer to publicly announce his forecast information, this paper shows that by making forecast information publicly available to both his manufacturer and to the competitor, a retailer is able to credibly share his forecast information —an outcome that cannot be achieved by merely exchanging information within the supply chain. We model a market compri...

We consider a variant of the wholesale price-only contract in a simple supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. In our model, the manufacturer decides the wholesale price first, and then the retailer chooses his order quantity before the stochastic demand is realized but postpones his pricing...

This study considers a manufacturer–retailer–streamer supply chain, in which the retailer first purchases products from manufacturer and then sells them to consumers through streamer. In live streaming context, usually cooperates with streamer by providing three different contracts: only commission of sale (OC), fixed fee (OF), (CF). Therefore, this develops theoretical model investigate effect...

This paper attempts to provide an explanation for a long-standing observation in supply chain management: while our models typically show that simple contracts cannot induce credible forecast sharing between different parties within the supply chain, why do firms often use them in practice, and exchange information through unverifiable communication (“cheap talk”)? We address this question usin...